Nournews: Five rounds of Iran-U.S. negotiations have taken place informally and with Oman’s mediation, without the United States presenting even a single written proposal. Iran’s Foreign Minister stated yesterday in a press conference: “The Omani side has proposed solutions to remove obstacles which are under review.” This implicitly indicates that not only has no plan been presented by the U.S., but Oman is filling this gap and advancing the talks on behalf of Washington.
While Iran, according to official statements, has put a clear and specific plan on the table to advance the negotiations, the U.S. side, by refusing to present a written proposal, is implementing a particular strategy in the diplomatic game: a strategy of maintaining uncertainty to control outcomes without accepting political or legal costs.
Analysis within the framework of game theory active player, ambiguous player
In game theory, when two players are involved in a non-zero-sum game, the result can be win-win or lose-lose. However, the U.S., by refusing to define fixed rules, seeks to turn this game into an open game with variable rules.
In fact, the U.S. tries to maintain “strategic ambiguity,” placing itself in a position to leave the game at any moment, change the rules, or throw the ball into Iran’s court.
On the other hand, Iran has tried, by presenting a clear plan, to steer the game toward a “closed game with a defined strategy”; a place where each side must be accountable, make commitments, and pay political and legal costs for every decision.
In the risky and multilayered space of nuclear diplomacy, what appears on the surface as the absence of a simple document from the United States in recent Iran-U.S. negotiations is actually part of a complex and deep strategic game designed based on game theory. The United States, as an actor experienced in designing opaque games, in this round of interactions, by refusing to present a “written proposal,” effectively rewrites the rules of the game in its favor and benefits from “structural ambiguity.”
Within the framework of game theory, when one party clarifies the rules by presenting a clear plan, it creates the basis for a limited, defined, and predictable game; a game in which responsibility, exchange of concessions, and strategic costs are part of the relations. But the U.S., by avoiding entering such a game, keeps the game in an “open” and unfocused form. In this structure, the American side is an “ambiguous” player—not only in meaning but in strategic design—so that it can simultaneously hold several scenarios without bearing any commitment to any of them.
This pattern resembles tactical behaviors in games of incomplete information; where a player, by concealing goals, plans, and priorities, disrupts the opponent’s decision-making power. The U.S., using the tool of “tactical ambiguity” and through the Oman intermediary channel, practically tests Iran’s behavior model in the absence of definite data. This is similar to the testing phase in interactive games; where the active player tries, without entering the real game, to extract the opponent’s probable reaction pattern in future scenarios from responses to limited stimuli.
On the other hand, Iran has tried to push the game from a “floating” form toward a “symmetric” form. In this type of game, each player is forced to define positions, commitments, and red lines. Entering the symmetric game, although costly, allows for more rational management; because decision-making is done based on clear assumptions rather than ambiguity.
Strategically, the U.S. behavior pursues several clear objectives:
• First, exploiting the absence of a plan to manage domestic and foreign public opinion; creating the image of “diplomatic activity” without any real concessions being given.
Trump recently said: “Serious progress has been made in talks with Iran.” While there is no document, these statements are merely to manage public expectations and convey Washington’s “active engagement.”
• Second, testing Iran’s behavior without paying the cost of the test; that is, “free modeling” of Tehran’s reactions.
• Third, maintaining the upper hand in the game with “zero commitment”; that is, remaining at the negotiation level without entering binding legal or diplomatic stages.
This lawless and ambiguous game is not merely a temporary tactic, but part of the U.S.’s “oscillating” strategy; a strategy in which Washington tries to increase its maneuverability by playing with the rules rather than within them.
NOURNEWS