Gharibabadi made the comments in a statement in response to a report issued by Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (I.A.E.A.) Rafael Grossi alleging that Iran had carried out nuclear activities with undeclared materials.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran is neither pursuing nuclear weapons nor does it possess any undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Iran has hitherto remained committed to all of its obligations,” Gharibabadi said in his detailed statement published on the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s website Sunday.
He also warned that Iran will be compelled to “adopt and implement appropriate decisions” should its patience abused by certain countries.
The full text of Gharibabadi’s statement is as follows:
The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has released his new report regarding certain safeguards-related matters pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, I wish to convey the following points:
First, the IAEA’s Director General has cited the November 2024 Resolution as the mandate for the preparation of this report. Regrettably, the resolution in question was adopted in a political move by the three European states and the United States in the Board of Governors without consensus and with total disregard for the outcomes of the Director General’s visit to Iran. It is unfortunate that the Director General, in the present report, has made no reference whatsoever to this disregard for his mandate by those states.
Second, the entirety of this report pertains to the alleged presence of a limited amount of nuclear material at four purported locations more than two decades ago, based on a series of fabricated data provided by the Zionist regime. Notably, nowhere in the report is there any ambiguity concerning Iran’s current nuclear activities or any deviation in its nuclear materials or operations. In this regard, several points merit consideration:
All allegations pertaining to Iran’s past nuclear program were, pursuant to the November 2015 Resolution following the conclusion of the JCPOA, formally closed. The I.A.E.A.’s current actions are, therefore, in explicit contradiction with the provisions of the resolution in question and constitute a political attempt to resurrect unproven and misleading allegations.
The I.A.E.A. itself states in the report that two of the four locations in question—namely Lavizan-Shian and the so-called Marivan—are no longer considered outstanding issues. The emphasis placed on these two matters and their reappearance in the report serve no purpose other than to repackage old, unsubstantiated allegations into an inflated dossier for the purpose of renewed political exploitation against Iran.
As to the other two sites—Varamin and Turquzabad—it must be underscored that Iran has furnished the I.A.E.A. with the necessary explanations and supporting documents, including during two recent visits by the Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards to Tehran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has had no undeclared nuclear materials or activities, nor does it currently possess any. It is a matter of record that extensive documentation and explanations have been submitted to the I.A.E.A. regarding these two sites, the allegations concerning which date back more than twenty years. While all of Iran’s nuclear materials and activities are under the I.A.E.A. monitoring and verification and no deviation has been observed, the magnification of these two alleged issues and the exaggerated expression of concern thereon is a mere pretext to fabricate a contrived sense of alarm—particularly in a region where the Zionist regime remains outside all instruments of weapons of mass destruction disarmament treaties and is armed with such weaponry, while the Agency and the claimant states lack the courage to take any action.
Third, although the I.A.E.A. claims in its report that “these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material,” it also explicitly affirms elsewhere in the same report that “the Agency has found no credible indications of the existence of an undeclared structured nuclear program currently being implemented in Iran, and it takes note of statements by Iran’s highest authorities that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic law.” This acknowledgment by the I.A.E.A. reveals that, under political pressure from certain states, the Agency has been reduced to an instrument for reopening previously closed files, thereby exerting pressure on Iran.
Fourth, another issue raised in the report that lies entirely outside the scope of the I.A.E.A.’s assigned mandate is that of 60% uranium enrichment. The report states: “Although enrichment activities under safeguards are not prohibited per se, the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State producing and accumulating uranium enriched up to 60% continues to be a source of serious concern and has drawn international attention in view of its potential proliferation implications.” On this point, it must be emphasized that so long as a country’s nuclear activities are under the I.A.E.A.’s monitoring, there is no cause for concern. According to Agency instruments, there exists no limitation on the level of enrichment, and the only relevant restriction is the prohibition on the diversion of such activities or materials to non-peaceful purposes.
Within this framework, the Director General has neither the right nor even the obligation to designate a lawful activity as one of concern. Mr. Grossi’s action in this regard is entirely political and aligned with the interests of certain specific states, for which he must be held accountable.
Fifth, another extraneous matter raised by Mr. Grossi in the report relates to Modified Code 3.1. It must be acknowledged that following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the failure of the three European parties to fulfill their obligations under the agreement, the Islamic Republic of Iran—in execution of the Strategic Action Law enacted by the Islamic Consultative Assembly—suspended the implementation of its voluntary nuclear obligations beyond the Safeguards Agreement under the JCPOA. Modified Code 3.1, which pertains to the early declaration of nuclear facilities, does not constitute a safeguards obligation, and the IAEA’s continued invocation of it as such does not confer any legitimacy thereon.
Sixth, the report further alleges that “in recent years, Iran has implemented de-designations of experienced inspectors in a manner that undermines the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards effectively and efficiently.” It must be noted, however, that pursuant to the I.A.E.A.’s report on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in 2024, as of 31 December 2024, a total of 274 inspectors were employed in Iran’s operational divisions and the verification office, with 120 of those inspectors specifically stationed in the Iran verification office. That the Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the political action of the three European states in the Board of Governors, revoked the designation of certain inspectors of those nationalities must not be interpreted as an impairment of the I.A.E.A.’s capacity or capability in Iran. It is self-evident that Iran cannot reasonably be expected to place full confidence in inspectors holding the nationality of such states, and the withdrawal of their designation constitutes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sovereign right under the Safeguards Agreement. It is indeed regrettable that Mr. Grossi ignores the presence and work of 120 inspectors of various nationalities operating in Iran and reduces the entirety of the I.A.E.A.’s capability to a mere handful of inspectors from three European states.
Seventh, all of the foregoing stands in stark contrast to the fact that this very report states: “Iran continues to cooperate with the Agency on routine safeguards matters, and the Agency is undertaking extensive verification efforts in the country in line with its nuclear fuel cycle and related activities.” Moreover, the 2024 Safeguards Implementation Report notes:
“Based on the evaluation conducted, the Secretariat has concluded that the declared nuclear material in 31 States, including Iran, remained in peaceful activities.”
That same report also contains several noteworthy figures. For instance, it indicates that among the 32 countries that have concluded safeguards agreements without Additional Protocols in force, of which Iran is one, 21 out of 100 safeguarded nuclear facilities are located in Iran. Of the 682 inspections conducted among this group of states, 493 were carried out in Iran alone. Out of 224 design information verifications, 144 were conducted solely in Iran. Of the total 1,895 inspector-days across this group, 1,260 were expended in Iran alone. Furthermore, the report states that €22,626,000 of the Agency’s regular €38,905,000 budget for 2024 was spent exclusively in Iran. Additionally, €4,300,000 of the Agency’s €28,000,000 in extrabudgetary or voluntary contributions were also allocated to activities in Iran.
What does such an extensive volume of the Agency’s activities in Iran signify, if not Iran’s constructive and comprehensive cooperation with the I.A.E.A.? That the Agency has found no diversion and no irregularity whatsoever with respect to the ongoing safeguards concerning Iran’s nuclear materials and activities, yet has directed its focus toward previously closed matters—what does this indicate, if not a politically motivated act carried out under the pressure of certain states?
Eighth, throughout the history of the I.A.E.A., numerous instances of politicization and political manipulation have been observed within this international body. The deafening silence of Western countries, the United States, and Agency officials in the face of the Zionist Israeli regime exemplifies this politicization. On the other hand, we have previously witnessed that, in the case of two Member States of the Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had conducted undeclared enrichment activities, their files were closed in the Board of Governors without any consequential action whatsoever. Why, then, are the I.A.E.A. and certain states seeking to fabricate a contrived dossier against the Islamic Republic of Iran by reviving unsubstantiated and, indeed, closed allegations? The judgment lies indeed with the court of public opinion.
Ninth, and finally, let it be stated unequivocally: the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither pursuing nuclear weapons nor does it possess any undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Iran has hitherto remained committed to all of its obligations. The cost that Iran has borne has been for the sake of preserving its dignity, honor, progress, and steadfastness in the face of coercion and the hegemonic ambitions of certain powers. Should these states choose to abuse Iran’s patience and persist in their erroneous path, Iran will be compelled, commensurate with the evolving circumstances and actions of the other parties, to adopt and implement appropriate decisions, the responsibility, consequences, and ramifications of which shall rest entirely with those states.
MNA