Few doubt that Iran’s confrontation with its Western rivals—particularly the United States and Europe—has now reached its most acute and complex stage, with political intricacies at their highest level. The experience of the 12-day war demonstrated that the Iranian nuclear file cannot be resolved to the West’s liking through coercive or aggressive means. This episode proved in practice that a military strategy against Iran is of minimal effect: it provokes a firm Iranian response and, moreover, strengthens national unity while rallying popular support for punishing the aggressor.
Although Washington politicians persist in reiterating their unilateral and domineering stance on Iran’s uranium enrichment, it is unlikely they have failed to grasp that military pressure alone cannot alter Tehran’s core policies.
Voice of diplomacy grows stronger
Nevertheless, statements from Iranian officials, politicians, and senior diplomats on the nuclear issue send a clear and hopeful message about the prospect of reaching a reliable understanding. Masoud Pezeshkian has underscored the importance—and indeed the necessity—of dialogue with Western counterparts on the nuclear question, while shrewdly reminding listeners that no step will be taken without the coordination or consent of the Supreme Leader. This could be interpreted as signaling that Iran’s willingness to pursue negotiations enjoys backing at the highest level of authority.
At the same time, First Vice-President Mohammad-Reza Aref has spoken of the government’s determination to employ “maximum diplomacy” in the nuclear case. Meanwhile, Takht-Ravanchi, a key figure in Iran’s negotiating team with the West, has sent the world a message of readiness for engagement.
In this climate, it appears that the country’s nuclear diplomacy intends to re-enter the field—this time with greater force. Takht-Ravanchi’s recent high-profile interview with an international news agency shows that, while safeguarding the red lines of its nuclear program, Tehran is willing to accept specific, time-bound limitations similar to those agreed during the 2013–2015 nuclear talks, provided economic sanctions are lifted and credible security guarantees are given.
This stance clearly signals Iran’s readiness to revive the “win–win negotiation” framework, a concept it has championed for years. The core of this approach is that neither side seeks the unconditional surrender of the other, and both commit to respecting mutual, attainable interests. Unlike rigid and confrontational methods that have led to deeper deadlock and escalating tensions, this strategy offers a path back to meaningful dialogue—one that balances national security and economic development with legitimate political and economic expectations.
Accepting limitations in exchange for lifting sanctions
Takht-Ravanchi has made it clear that halting uranium enrichment is not on Iran’s agenda, calling it a fundamental right under international treaties. At the same time, Iran is prepared to take steps toward de-escalation by setting defined technical and temporal limits—on one condition: sanctions must be lifted in measurable, phased stages to quickly and tangibly benefit the economy. This phased model draws on lessons from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) to avoid repeating past mistakes.
Tehran also expects genuine security guarantees from the other side, ensuring no repeat of attacks or military operations against its nuclear facilities. This demand stems from practical experience in recent years and the deep mistrust that, if left unaddressed, would severely undermine the prospects for a stable, reliable agreement.
The central challenge to this framework remains the “trust deficit” between Iran and the United States and other Western parties. Washington must prove that it genuinely adheres to the “win–win” principle and does not intend to use talks merely as a tool for additional pressure. Without clarity and sincerity of intent, nuclear diplomacy will remain stuck at a stage of purely symbolic, inconclusive negotiations. Regional and extra-regional players can also play a decisive role—their support or opposition could either ease the path to agreement or add to the pressures.
The “win–win negotiation” is more than a diplomatic option; it is an essential route for Iran today—one that could ease the economic and political costs of sanctions while paving the way for sustainable development and national security. Takht-Ravanchi’s statements reflect a conditional but real intent to engage in talks, but now the ball is in the other side’s court to show whether it is willing to enter a genuine, reciprocal process based on mutual respect. Without that, the nuclear chess match between Iran and the West will remain trapped in stalemate and tension, and the aspiration for a “win–win agreement” will stay a slogan rather than a lasting reality.
By declaring its readiness to conditionally accept certain limitations on the extent and level of enrichment—but not the principle itself—Iran has taken the first step toward reviving win–win negotiations. It is now up to Western parties to demonstrate genuine willingness toward this framework. This much is certain: alongside signaling readiness for reasoned diplomacy, Iran also stands prepared to confront any malicious or aggressive act.
NOURNEWS